Communication channels from the operations centre at Durban's Moses Mabhida stadium to the Joint Operations Centre of Durban will be secured by a quantum cryptography system.
However, analysts say this may not be required for the event.
Project manager Abdul Mirza says this initiative by the University of KwaZulu-Natal's Centre for Quantum Technology (CQT) is called QuantumStadium. He explains that it uses quantum cryptography, or more accurately quantum key distribution (QKD), to allow for secure communication and will be unveiled at the stadium later this month.
Johann van der Merwe, part of the advisory for PricewaterhouseCoopers, adds that QKD is used to establish shared, secret keys in support of encryption.
The project specifically aims to secure communication - e-mails, video links and phone calls - between the operations centre at Durban's World Cup stadium and the Joint Operations Centre of Durban, according to Mirza.
Head of Durban's Strategic Projects Unit and 2010 Programme, Julie-May Ellingson, says: “A joint operations centre will mobilise and reallocate resources and the overall safety and security planning will be collated by the Provincial Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure. This structure will report directly to a national structure to allow for consistent and unified safety across SA.”
Mirza says this is the first public global event to use such technology. Previously, it had been used in the Geneva elections and also as research demonstrations in various other countries.
Mirza explains that the QuantumStadium project is a spin-off of another joint initiative by eThekwini and the CQT, known as the QuantumCity initiative. This project uses similar technology to provide quantum-secured communication between some links in the eThekwini region.
Securing communication
“Quantum cryptography encodes information into a quantum system, which is then sent to the receiver. This differs from conventional cryptography that uses 'complex' computer algorithms that are hard to reverse in order to scramble the information,” says Mirza.
Van der Merwe further explains that this system differs from conventional cryptography, because it relies on information-theoretic secrecy, based on the laws of physics, as opposed to mathematical techniques that are based on computational complexity.
“The technology is theoretically secure. However, this guarantee is dependent on the implementation of the system. As the research continues, further enhancements are made to the systems to bring them to their theoretical limit,” says Mirza.
Van der Merwe says two communicating parties will know if there is any interference in their communication because the principle which QKD is based on states that anyone measuring a quantum system will disturb it. “This means you cannot interfere with the channel without introducing noise, which may be detected by the communication parties, if the system is correctly implemented.”
Despite this, he adds that communication can still be at risk without additional security measures, since many attacks on communication systems are not on the methods used to protect information in transit.
“Quantum cryptography also cannot provide, for example, authentication of the communicating parties, so you need a conventional authentication scheme to secure a QKD implementation; after the key has been shared it falls back on conventional cryptography. Quantum cryptography only prevents eavesdropping on the communications channel so it is still possible to eavesdrop at the end points.”
He also says quantum cryptography does not provide network security or computer security. Because of this, Van der Merwe says more security measures need to be in place at the stadium, alongside this system.
“QKD only provides secure key establishment, which is one of many security building blocks needed to secure a communication system.”
Unnecessary?
Van der Merwe and director of Information Security Group Africa Karel Rode say there are certain factors that will determine whether this system is needed or not.
Van der Merwe says there will be nothing wrong with using it, if the system is correctly implemented.
“I will only be able to justify such a technology once I determine the 'value' of the information that we need to protect, the threat potential and frequency, and through that derive the value proposition of such a technology, compared to something that is better known and easy to maintain after deployment,” says Rode.
However, Rode does not see the practical use for such an excessive solution to deliver potentially a very high level of protection to data in motion. “This protection level only has value to time-sensitive information, while it is in motion, as it is very hard to force compliance to third-party policies once data has moved out of my/our control.”
In terms of World Cup needs, Van der Merwe says security systems based on conventional cryptography, that are properly designed and implemented, will be adequate. He also says the cost of a system of this nature as opposed to a conventional one will be difficult to justify in practice.
But he adds that this system symbolises advancement, since the project is moving into a new stage of security.
Post World Cup
Mirza says quantum cryptography technology looks at improving the ICT sector through nanotechnology and quantum physics and so, after the World Cup, the system can either remain at the stadium, or be moved to other vital links within the municipal network.
He adds that a company is being set up in order to make the technology commercial.
Van der Merwe says companies are unlikely to take up this type of technology at the moment.
“A quantum cryptography system can be used within any environment that needs secure key establishment in support of protecting the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive information. The cost of a quantum cryptography system versus using conventional security systems will be difficult to justify.”
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