After several years of anticipation of "The Year of the Certificate," 1998 has almost passed by without a wide-scale shift from certificate pilots to full-scale implementation. Immediate pressures to focus on Y2K readiness are likely to keep certificate technology in the background. The proliferation of digital certificate technologies is more likely to come in the later part of 2000.
Yet, digital signatures and certificates can help address some of the security challenges involved in electronic collaboration and commerce. With the growing use of the Internet, partnernets, and sensitive intranets, the use of certificates is gradually finding a place in the array of tools for enhanced authentication, authorization, and nonrepudiation.
The Promise: Secure Interaction
Businesses and government agencies doing business electronically with each other and with the public face a number of security challenges. The first is the selection and management of an architecture that can handle the potentially large number of persons and businesses that might want to interact with the organization over the public Internet.
In 1998, one-third of personal computer users, or more than 97 million users, had access to the World Wide Web. Of those, nearly 18 million have purchased goods or services via the Internet. These buyers represent potential users of systems that support electronic interaction and commerce.
The number of consumers on the Internet is expected to approach 130 million in just four years. This number represents significant business potential, but it also represents a staggering management challenge.
The second challenge to the enterprise seeking to use the Internet is the difficulty of establishing the identity of an individual over the Internet. The open, changing nature of the Internet provides anonymity, but business usage of public networks requires tighter control. The requirement for control becomes even more important when financial information or private data about individuals is exchanged in a transaction.
Digital Signatures for Authentication and Integrity
Account names and passwords are traditional ways to identify and authenticate users of a computer system. Clearly, other means are required to conduct business electronically with the general public or with any subset of widely distributed users. Without being able to assure that data transmitted is received in an altered state, Internet commerce would pose dramatic risks to both sides of a transaction.
Digital signature technology provides a means to establish the authenticity and integrity of electronic communications. The process involves a few simple steps. Prior to sending data to a recipient - an e-mail message, electronic form, Java applet - the sender`s signature-enabled application creates a message digest, a unique numeric value representing the data, using a mathematical function. The sender uses the private signing key to encrypt the message digest. The encrypted digest becomes the sender`s digital "signature." The sender appends the signature to the data and transmits the signature and the data to the receiver.
The receiver calculates a message digest for the received data. The receiver uses the sender`s public key to decrypt the digital signature and compares the decrypted message digest to the calculated digest. If the values match, the receiver can be certain that data was not changed in transit. The strength of encryption algorithms used is such that the odds approach the impossible for altered data to digest the same way as the original data.
Matching message digests validates the integrity of the message. The authenticity of the message is validated because the sender`s public key decrypted the digital signature. No other public key can decrypt the signature created by the sender`s private key.
These techniques have been in use for several years, and as a result, standards have taken shape. The US federal requirements for digital signature technology is defined in FIPS 186, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), which specifies the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) used in conjunction with FIPS 180-1, Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1), for message digest computation. Two of the leading commercial standards are the RSA algorithm for signatures and the MD5 algorithm for message digests.
Encryption for Privacy
Because the clear-text nature of the Internet makes privacy an issue, encryption is frequently deployed to protect the privacy and confidentiality of information. Starting with the process described above, the sender encrypts the data with the receiver`s public key before it is sent. Upon receipt, the receiver uses the private key to decrypt the data and validate the signature as described above. Only the receiver`s private key can decrypt the data encrypted with the receiver`s public key, thus ensuring the confidentiality of the data. The strength of the encryption is a related to the algorithms used and the length of the encryption key. IDC recommends a key length of 80 to 90 bits, at minimum, for encrypting stored data.
In some forms of public key cryptography, the same key pair can be used to both sign and encrypt the data. IDC recommends that organizations maintain separate signing and encryption keys and that encryption keys be backed up. Corporate data that is stored in encrypted form must be recoverable for any of a variety of reasons. Some sort of backup or recovery mechanism for encryption keys is required. The concept of backing up or recovering encryption keys is an area of intense debate in the security community.
IDC recommends that signature keys not be backed up. Doing so negates the principle of nonrepudiation. It is difficult to "prove" that an individual digitally signed a document if a copy of the private signing key is under the control of an entity other than the individual.
Again, standards have emerged in this space. Commercial encryption standards include algorithms from RSA (RC2, RC4, which are 40, 128-bit keys), Entrust`s CAST (64, 80, 128-bit keys), and IDEA, a European standard. Most commercial products providing digital signatures and encryption support the commercial standards as well as DES and Triple DES. The federal standard for encryption of unclassified data is FIPS 46-2, the Digital Encryption Standard (DES, with a 56-bit key) and Triple DES (key length greater than 120 bits), and Skipjack (for Fortezza -- see section below titled Public Key Infrastructure).
Digital Certificates
The primary approach for the general use of public key certificates is defined by ANSI standard X.509. A digital certificate bonds a public key with an identity. An important issue in the use of digital signatures is ensuring that a person`s public key really belongs to that person and not someone else claiming to be that person. Person-to-person distribution of individual keys becomes impossible on a very wide scale. A practical alternative is to use a trusted third party to distribute public keys.
Certificates can be stored on computer disks or on devices like smart cards. Protection of the certificate demands added protection, such as protection with a PIN or biometrics. Just as initial distribution of certificates requires administrative overhead, protection of issued certificates and periodic reissuance or revocation also require ongoing attention.
Yet another component of certificate usage is the legal aspect. Several state governments have enacted legislation allowing certificate-based digital signatures. In late 1997, Utah issued the first license to a certificate authority to allow it to provide CA services in the state. Not surprisingly, the digital signature policies of the several states are not uniform, although there are several groups working to make them so.
Key Decisions for Deploying Certificates
Users of certificate authorities have multiple choices to make. The first is which products and applications to use. Because the technology is still evolving, application choice may drive the choice of product. The next major choice is whether to be the CA or to look to a third party. Several players help businesses set up internal certificate authorities or outsourced, third-party CA services. Outsourced certificate authorities can also be set up with an organization`s logo and brand so that it appears to all users that the CA is internal.
Issues
Digital signature and digital certificate technology is still in the pilot stage in most industry segments. Widespread adoption of the technology is necessary for secure but open commerce. Currently, industry segments are adopting the technology in stages. The automotive segment implement ANX shortly, which will deploy certificates for secure extranets. The banking and insurance industries are piloting certificates for online transactions of moderate dollar values. These industries are still working out the infrastructure issues.
For businesses in industry segments or geographies that lack industry support in creating the necessary infrastructure for widespread deployment, it is likely that certificates will remain in use primarily for intranet applications, such as e-mail.
Widespread adoption of certificate technology will also depend of the government acceptance of the use of the Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS), Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), Secure Socket Layer (SSL), and Secure MIME (S/MIME) now supported in market-leading WWW servers, browsers, e-mail, and related products.
Accepting Risk, Managing Expectations
Businesses wishing to do business electronically must be aware of the inherent risks and deploy reasonable technologies to reduce those risks. For an Internet application, the risks of financial loss or privacy invasion are usually weighed against the potential for increased business. In best practice, the cost of increased security is one of many costs of deploying a new Internet-based application.
The enormous potential for using the Internet to increase business-to-business collaboration and to create new sales opportunity by reaching a global base of consumers has created interest in the practical application of encryption for increased security.
IDC recommends that the decision on the use of certificate technology be made as part of the overall risk assessment for Internet-based applications. While the critical infrastructure issues are worked out, certificate technologies are likely to be most valuable for intranet applications where a global infrastructure is not essential.
When Y2K issues have been worked out and infrastructures and standards are more mature, certificates will indeed be ready for prime time.
This information obtained in this document is the exclusive property of IDC. It has been licensed for use only in the Republic of South Africa by IDC/SA/ Its use is restricted to South Africa. This information is not to be reproduced, transmitted, carried or mailed to any individuals or organisations outside the Republic of South Africa.
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